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COMMENT
THE "COMMON HERITAGE" OF OUTER SPACE: EQUAL
BENEFITS FOR MOST OF MANKIND
"We are the product of 4.5 billion years of fortuitous, slow, bio-
logical evolution. There is no reason to think that the evolutionary
process has stopped. Man is a transitional animal. . .. All that is
clear is that we cannot remain static."1
"Space, the final frontier."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Man has been exploring his surroundings throughout his entire ex-
istence. Endurance and adaptation to new environments have been
two of his strongest survival skills. Whether the uncharted discipline
is geography, science, or philosophy, man has always sought to ex-
pand his boundaries. Societies that have "expanded their frontiers"
have prospered while those that cease to explore may experience
"long term, detrimental effects."3 Some have described the current era
of space exploration as being analogous to the era of Christopher Co-
lumbus.4  Although the specific benefits of space remain uncertain, 5
1. CARL SAGAN, CARL SAGAN'S COSMIC CONNECTION: AN EXTRATERRESTRIAL
PERSPECTIVE 5 (Cambridge University Press 2000) (1973).
2. Star Trek: The Man Trap (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 1966); see also The
Internet Movie Database, Memorable Quotes from "Star Trek," http://www.imdb.
com/title/ttOO60028/quotes (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
3. The Future of NASA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the S. Comm. on Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. 5, 8 (2003) [hereinafter
Space Hearing] (statement of Brian Chase, Executive Director of the National Space Society)
(articulating why the United States should go into outer space).
4. Id. at 14. Brian Chase, Executive Director of the National Space Society, warned
that it is wrong to think of modern space flight as analogous to times of Christopher Colum-
bus, but more like Leif Erikson due to inefficient technology. Id. Because of these technologi-
cal limitations, Alex Roland, Professor of History at Duke University and former NASA his-
torian, suggested trading manned space flight for automated missions until technology can fly
humans more safely into space. Id. at 18 (statement of Alex Roland, Professor of History,
Duke University).
5. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
1
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space exploration will certainly change almost every aspect of human
life. Satellite communications alone are enabling scientists and re-
searchers to monitor weather, protect endangered species, identify
pending disasters, and extend education to remote villages around the
world.6 Benefits to specific industries could also come in the form of
new mineral resources, evolving technology, or scientific advance-
ments. In this regard, space exploration is something akin to discover-
ing the New World.
Jurisprudence is now equally entering unknown territory. In re-
cent years, international bodies have begun drafting laws to govern
both the exploration and exploitation of outer space.7 The corpus juris
spatialis, the body of space law, 8 is a unique development in interna-
tional law because it proposes a new structure for international inter-
action on Earth-based collective efforts in outer space. 9 For example,
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (referring generally to "the
great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space") (em-
phasis added); see also Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C § 70101(a)(1) (2003) [here-
inafter CSLA] (finding generally that "the peaceful uses of outer space continue to be of great
value and to offer benefits to all mankind") (emphasis added).
6. See generally UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY MEETING ON OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES, SPACE SOLUTIONS FOR THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS: HOW THE UNITED NATIONS
FAMILY USES SPACE TECHNOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at
http://www.uncosa.unvienna.org.
7. The earliest international treaty that addressed activities in outer space was signed in
1963. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban
Treaty]. The first U.S. policy concerning outer space efforts was enacted in 1958. See Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (1958) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (2006)).
8. Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space,
48 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 64-65 (2000) (listing the five space treaties that comprise the corpusjuris
spatialis); Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha": Military Use of the International
Space Station and the Concepts of "Peaceful Purposes," 53 A.F. L. Rev. 135, 147-48 (2002)
(referring to six treaties as the core of the corpus juris spatialis); see also United Nations
Treaties and Principles on Space Law (2002), http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/Space
Law/treaties.html. The United Nations names five multilateral treaties and five General As-
sembly resolutions that comprise the body of governing space law. Id.; U.N. COPUOS,
LEGAL SUBCOMM., 42nd Sess., 714th mtg., 1 12-13, U.N. Doc. V.05-85379 (Apr. 3, 2005)
(statement of Kenneth Hodgkins, Delegate for the U. S.). Hodgkins references "the four core
outer space treaties" and then goes on to discuss all of the recognized treaties excluding the
Moon Treaty. See id. This implies that the United States, which is not a member of the Moon
Treaty, does not recognize the Moon Treaty as a part of the corpus juris spatialis. See id.
Therefore, there is still no consensus on the extent of the corpus.
9. The U.S. Department of Defense has suggested that space technologies enhance
military coalitions. See Memorandum from William S. Cohen, U.S. Sec'y of Def., to the
Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Sec'ys of Def.,
Dir. of Def. Research & Eng'g, Assistant Sec'ys of Def., Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def.,
Inspector Gen. of the Dep't of Def., Assistants to the Sec'y of Def., Dirs. of Def. Agencies
(Jul. 9. 1999) [hereinafter Space Memo] (on file with author); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.
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while the idea of complete demilitarization of Earth's terrain may be
thought to be impossible, many within the international community
are struggling to secure such a mandate in space.' 0 One of the most
important new principles to pervade every space law document is the
idea of "Common Heritage."'" This idea has been used before in po-
litical rhetoric, but there is no agreement about its precise definition.12
At least some believe that "Common Heritage" guarantees that all
mankind have an equal share in the benefits that will come from
reaching into outer space.13
Pioneering states will interpret the new rules of outer space ac-
cording to their own interests and needs. The ways in which humanity
will benefit from space will be an area of great controversy between
technologically developed countries and those still struggling to make
their space debut. But as law-makers begin to draft legislation con-
cerning permissible conduct in space, more and more technology will
be tailored towards that same end. 14
Space law is unique in that it is likely the first time in history that
states will generally draft domestic policies based on international
norms rather than the reverse. When most states first adopt interna-
tional space agreements, they will have neither a space program nor
any legislation concerning space exploration. 5 This fact will enable
more consistent legislation among different states, but will make adap-
DIRECTIVE No. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY § 4.13 (Jul. 9, 1999) [hereinafter SPACE POLICY]. (sug-
gesting that international cooperation in space will "forge closer security ties with U.S. allies
and friends" and "improve interoperability between U.S. and allied forces").
10. DELBERT D. SMITH, SPACE STATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 138-39
(1979) (discussing whether "peaceful purposes" means no military activity or just no aggres-
sive actions); see also Petras, supra note 8, at 161-62, 176 (2002) (interpreting the Outer
Space Treaty to mandate demilitarization of space and discussing Russia's expressed desire to
prohibit military operations in space).
11. CTR. FOR RESEARCH OF AIR & SPACE LAW, McGILL UNIV., SPACE ACTIVITIES AND
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte ed., 1984). This term was put
into use by the emerging super-powers in space. Id. at 327. This idea has since become a
central theme throughout all space law. See id
12. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 154-55. Although "Common Heritage" has been pro-
posed before, it has only been accepted as long as there is no interference with political or
economic activities. Id. The definition of "Common Heritage" has been steered away from
including equal "sharing." Id.
13. See SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 327.
14. Manifestation of the "Common Heritage" Principle will most likely ultimately be
determined by what language is adopted and what language is rejected. Practice and capacity
will change how international actors approach such a principle.
15. See Bruce Hurwitz, Book Reviews and Notes, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1116, 1117 (1985)
(reviewing DAMODAR WADEGAONKAR, THE ORBIT OF SPACE LAW (1984)). Nevertheless,
eighty-four states have signed on to the Outer Space Treaty. Id.; Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 5, signatories.
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tations to international law difficult in the future because it will poten-
tially require states to redraft their domestic space laws.
As the United States drafts its domestic policies for space explora-
tion and exploitation, the duties and privileges included in the "Com-
mon Heritage" Principle must be defined to avoid conflict with inter-
national law. This paper will first analyze the history of space
exploration to see how the "Common Heritage" Principle has been de-
fined as the field has evolved. It will then look at modern space law to
see what the "Common Heritage" Principle means in current legal
practice. Finally, in the midst of pending U.S. space legislation, this
comment will try to reconcile the ideal of equal sharing and the prac-
tice of equal access.
Although many nations are likely looking to advance their own in-
terests, it is critical that the United States recognize that its actions
will have a major impact on the space industry because it has been the
industry leader. 6 Despite drawbacks, the Untied States has the big-
gest independent space program.17 Because of its unique position,18 the
United States will likely have the largest influence on what legal
frameworks are adopted or rejected.
16. See Larry Wheeler, U.S. Losing Unofficial Space Race, Congressmen Say, FLORIDA
TODAY, Mar. 31, 2006, available at http://www.space.com/news/ft 060331_nasachina_
congress.html (stating that NASA "has lost the commanding lead it once held over the rest of
the world in human space exploration").
17. The United States had a budget of $16.623 billion for their space program in 2006.
NASA, NASA FY 2007 BUDGET REQUEST SUMMARY (2006), www.nasa.gov/
pdf/142458main FY07_budgetjfull.pdf. The next largest budget was the European Space
Agency's which was approximately $3.296 billion dollars (2904 million euros). European
Space Agency, ESA FACTS AND FIGURES (2006), www.esa.int/esaCP/
GGG4SXG3AECindex 0.html. China holds another of the larger space programs, which is
currently considered one of the United States' major competitors. Wheeler, supra note 16.
China has vague responses to questions about its budget, but as of yet the budget does not
reach NASA's budget. See Jeff Foust, China, Competition, and Cooperation, THE SPACE
REVIEW, Apr. 10, 2006, www.Thespacereview.com/article/599/1. China is estimated to spend
anywhere between $1.4 and $2.2 billion dollars a year. Dean Cheng, Dragons in Orbit:
China's Space Program Merits Greater Attention, SPACE NEWS, Aug. 21, 2006.
www.space.con/spacenews/archive06/ChengOpEd 0814.html.
18. Space Hearing, supra note 3, at 3-4 (statement of Marcia Smith, Specialist in Aero-
space Tech. Policy from the Cong. Research Serv.). "Why the moon? Why Mars? Because
it is humanity's destiny to strive to seek to find and because it is America's destiny to lead."
Id. at 4 (quoting George H. W. Bush, U.S. President, 20th Anniversary of Apollo Lunar Land-
ing Speech (July 1989)).
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II. "COMMON HERITAGE": SPACE EXPLORATION AND
ITS LOFTY GOALS
Initially, man's exploration of space was dominated by govern-
ment initiatives. 9 In the past, civilian programs complimented gov-
ernment projects to explore outer space, but government investments
funded the bulk of space research.20 As a result, space technology has
dual-uses: civilian and military.2' Consequently, space law continues
to be highly influenced by the era during which it was first drafted: the
Cold War.22 This has led to a competitive model in space23 despite ef-
forts to create a cooperative community.
A. The Space Race
In 1957, the United Soviet Socialist Republic (Soviet Union)
launched the first satellite named "Sputnik" into outer space as the
first step in the Space Race.24 On the other side of the planet, the
United States became alarmed by the prospect of being left behind in
the Space Race.25 President Dwight Eisenhower passed the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 195826 as a civilian component to a re-
newed national space effort,27 reserving any military operations in
19. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the
Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (2004) (describing the origins of
space law as being characterized by use and governance of nation-states); see also Petras, su-
pra note 8, at 135-36 (noting the parallel development of military space technology).
20. See generally Petras, supra note 8, and sources cited (discussing the impact of U.S.
and Soviet Union military initiatives on the development of space programs).
21. See generally Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian
Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REV. 157 (2004). Space
technology inherently serves both scientific and military purposes at once. Id. For example, a
satellite may be used to take pictures both for maps and for coordinating military operations.
Id. at 171-72.
22. ROGER D. LAUNIUS, NASA: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM 17-18
(1994) (discussing the effects of Sputnik, the first satellite shot into orbit, on the United
States); Waldrop, supra note 21, at 159.
23. See generally LAUNIUS, supra note 22, at 18-28. Efforts by the United States to not
be left behind in the Space Race created a competitive model. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 17; see also Waldrop, supra note 21, at 159.
25. LAUNIUS, supra note 22, at 17-18.
26. See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426
(1958).
27. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 159; National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42
U.S.C. § 2451 (2006). An interesting provision to note in subsection (a) is that Congress de-
clares the official U.S. policy in space as one that "should" be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind. Id. The purpose is therefore not restricted to peaceful pur-
poses, just encouraged. See id.
5
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space for the Department of Defense.28 The United States believed it
needed to gain the position as the leader in space or risk losing the
Cold War. 29 This created a direct connection between outer space ex-
ploration and military superiority.
Because of its military nature, space exploration has lead to a
myriad of concerns for the entire world.3" Questions concerning is-
sues such as the precise definition of "peaceful purposes" have be-
come more urgent as new countries reach levels of development
where they too have access to space.3' Groups of countries with simi-
lar interests and interpretations have joined together in international
agreements and to make declarations over specific issues. 32
There is one governing body that tries to manage these concerns.
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) was created to promote the peaceful exploration of
space.33 COPUOS provides guidance and acts as a focal point for the
growing variety of alliances.34 Unfortunately, a mechanism for en-
forcement has not yet been developed.
28. See generally SPACE POLICY, supra note 9.
29. See KENNETH GATLAND, MANNED SPACECRAFT 100 (Macmillan Publ'g Co., Inc.
1976) (1967).
30. To understand the depth of fear the United States was experiencing, one might re-
call the Ronald Reagan speech about "Star Wars." See Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Ad-
dress to the Nation on Defense and National Security (Mar. 23, 1983), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm); CNN Cold War - His-
torical Documents: Reagan's "Star Wars" Speech, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/
cold.war/episodes/22/documents/starwars.speech (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (explaining that
the speech was denoted the "Star Wars" speech because Reagan sought to develop satellite
technology that could stop a nuclear attack). For a more personal effect, recall the "duck and
cover" drills children performed in elementary schools. See also Limited Test Ban Treaty,
supra note 7. This treaty was drafted to reach the "speediest possible achievement of an
agreement on general and complete disarmament." Id.
31. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, proclamation; see also Space Hearing, supra
note 3, (statement of Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator). To date, three nations have launched
astronauts into space, the United States, Russia, and China. See id. (statement of Sam
Brownback, U.S. Senator, that the U.S. and Russia were the only countries sending humans
into space as of April 2, 2003); Foust, supra note 17 (confirming that China has launched hu-
mans into space).
32. The European Space Agency includes Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Sta-
tion, Mar. 27, 2001, 1998 U.S.T. 212 [hereinafter ISS Agreement]. The European Space
Agency represents its members in the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil Inter-
national Space Station. Id.
33. Gabrynowicz, supra note 19, at 1043.
34. See International Co-operation In the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), I Al(a), U.N. Doc. A/1472 (Dec. 12, 1959) (establishing "a Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space ... [t]o review, as appropriate, the area of international cooperation,
and to study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses
of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under the United Nations auspices");
6
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B. Space Explorers
To date, few nations have achieved "space faring" capability,35
leaving most states with less developed technology outside of the
space industry.3 6  Space faring nations currently include the United
States, Russia, and China.37 Indeed, these states have begun a practice
of camaraderie by bringing visiting astronauts from other nations into
space for scientific purposes.38 Today, scientific research is not the
only reason to accept foreign passengers. Four wealthy entrepreneurs
have paid their way onto the International Space Station as the Earth's
first space tourists.39
Since the beginning of the Space Race, the United States has been
trying to maintain a technological edge over the rest of the world.40
But the terms of the Space Race have changed. Following virtually
see also id. B(I) (stating that "[t]he General Assembly . . . [d]ecides to convene ... under
the auspices of the United Nations, an international scientific conference of interested Mem-
bers of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for the exchange of ex-
perience in the peaceful uses of outer space").
35. "Space-faring" nations are those that can build and launch satellites into outer space.
See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 167.
36. See Nandisiri Jasentuliyana, The Development of the Outer Space Treaties and the
Legal Principles from a Third World Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 57, 59, 63 (Oct. 1997) (stating that developed
states have a "quasi-monopoly" in space and that developing states are working towards re-
ducing the "technological gap" that exists between themselves and developed states regarding
space technology).
37. Space Hearing, supra note 3, (statement of Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator).
38. For example, Brazil spent millions of U.S. dollars to send the first Brazillian astro-
naut to board the International Space Station (ISS) in a historic moment for the Brazilian peo-
ple. See generally Tales Azzoni, Homeland Has Much to Gain from Spaceflight, Brazilian
Astronaut Says, SPACE.COM, (Apr. 8, 2006), http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/
060408_expl2_pontes.html. (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); see NASA Space Station Homepage,
available at http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/station/expeditions/expeditionl4. (follow
"Read more about Expidition 14" hyperlink). Biographies are available on the crews of the
ISS: currently hosting Commander Michael Lopez-Alegria from the United States, Flight En-
gineer Mikhail Tyurin from Russia, Flight Engineer Thomas Reiter of the European Space
Agency from Germany, Flight Engineer Sunita Williams from the United States, and Space-
flight Participant Anousheh Ansari from the United States (and the first member of Iranian
decent). Id. Previous crews have consisted of Roberto Vittori from Italy (Expedition 11), and
Pedro Duque from Spain (Expedition 8). For more details, see
http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/station/expeditions/ndex.htn-d (follow "Expedition 8"
hyperlink) (follow "Expedition 11" hyperlink).
39. Ker Than, Fourth Space Tourist, Expedition 14 Crew Docks at ISS, SPACE.COM,
Sep. 20, 2006, http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/060920_expl4_docking.html. In May
2001, Dennis Tito became the first space tourist. He has since been joined by Mark Shuttle-
worth in 2002, Greg Olsen in 2005, and the fist female, Anousheh Anasari, in 2006. Id.
40. Space Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator); see also
SPACE POLICY, supra note 9.
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simultaneous experiments to build national space stations,4' the United
States and Soviet Union joined forces under a growing number of na-
tional flags to maintain an International Space Station.42 The space
station is currently hosting astronauts from all over the world.43
The policy of joining forces with a potential rival has been em-
ployed by the United States before.' The United States was afraid
that old rockets produced in the Soviet Union would be converted to
ballistic missiles, so the United States encouraged Russia and the
Ukraine to enter the commercial launch industry in exchange for ac-
ceptance of nuclear arms proliferation controls.45
However, the United States has a very different role in the devel-
opment of the space program in the People's Republic of China. De-
spite restrictions on the exchange of information, China has developed
a successful "space-faring" program based on U.S. technology.46 As
China's space capabilities increase, some are encouraging the United
States to reconsider joint ventures with China.47
The United States must now reconsider its relationship with the
commercial sector in space exploration as well. It has become in-
creasingly expensive for the United States to continue its shuttle
launch program as the primary means of space transportation.48 Many
41. Petras, supra note 8, at 136; GATLAND, supra note 29, at 221, 230.
42. See ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 1(1)-(2).
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. Letter from John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, to Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Union
Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Mar. 7, 1962), available at
http://www.state.gove/www/about state/history/volume-vi/exchanges.html (discussing the
United States' intentions to strive for the cooperative use of outer space together with the So-
viet Union).
45. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 183. The United States encouraged Russia and the
Ukraine to commercialize their industry to ensure peaceful applications for their surplus mis-
sile technology. Id.
46. See generally id.; see also Foust, supra note 17. China has also invested in Ameri-
can companies in order to gain access to sensitive data and obtain plans through illegal intel-
ligence operations. H.R. REP. No. 105-851, vol. 1, ch.1, at 35 (1999). Counterintelligence is
even more difficult with China than it was with the Soviet Union during the Cold War be-
cause Chinese nationals are able to travel in and out of the United States with ease. See id. at
38-41.
47. See Leonard David, U.S.-China Cooperation: The Great Space Debate, SPACECOM
(Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.space.com/news/060412_china-cooperation.html (discussing the
current sentiment among American businesses wanting to collaborate with China); Wheeler,
supra note 16. But see Foust, supra note 17 (discussing alarm among U.S. officials concern-
ing China's space capabilities and intentions, but concluding that their concern is unfounded).
48. See Space Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Alex Roland, Professor of History,
Duke University) (discussing the growing inferiority of the NASA Shuttle). Since its con-
struction, the shuttle has been the major workhorse for NASA missions. Id. But these shut-
tles are expensive to maintain, and some have been in service for more than twenty years. Id.
Their decreasing capacity is evident by the Columbia accident. Id.
8
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countries, including the United States, are looking to private compa-
nies for affordable transportation into outer space.49 With this grow-
ing reliance on commercial rockets, private companies are launching
satellites and scientific equipment into space that conduct both civilian
and military objectives.5 0
Because of developing technology, private companies are in a
unique position to create new actors in outer space, intentionally and
accidentally. The commercial sector has been responsible for multiple
instances of errant technology reaching unauthorized parties.5 1
This comment distinguishes three types of space explorers as ac-
tors in the space industry: nation-state haves, nation-state have-nots,
and private companies. All three of these actors have been shaping
space law but have not yet put the law into practice. Vague provisions
within international treaties are usually defined by technological capa-
bilities and practice. But there have been two major lessons that will
necessarily alter the world's approach to space exploration. First, uni-
versal access to outer space will soon become a reality for many de-
veloping states, and such access is beyond the control of any single
nation. Second, cooperative efforts are more successful at developing
the space industry than are competitive practices. International space
law will need to reconcile the "Common Heritage" Principle with a
competitive economic model on a playing field that is not anywhere
near even.
III. "EXTRANATIONAL" LAW
Like most laws in history, the corpus juris spatialis was created
amidst conflict and fear. The Soviet Union and United States were
engaged in a race for economic, military, and technological superior-
ity.52 The fear of a nuclear attack from space has been a growing con-
cern for the international community as a whole. The COPUOS body
49. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 163, 165-66.
50. See id. at 162-63; Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and
Technology Related to Missiles, Apr. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 599 [hereinafter MTCR]. The
treaty specifically targets technology that can be dually employed for reusable entry vehicles
(shuttles) and as nuclear payload delivery systems (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). See
id.; see also Gabrynowicz, supra note 19, at 1056 (discussing how the United State is merging
many of its military and science programs to minimize costs).
51. See generally H.R. REP. No. 105-851, vol. 1, ch. 2, at 66-95 (1999) (discussing sev-
eral incidents where Chinese individuals stole technical data from U.S. weapons design labo-
ratories for the Chinese government); see also Waldrop, supra note 21, at 193, 194 (discuss-
ing Boeing's involvement in the unauthorized sharing of missile technology during a joint
venture with Russia).
52. SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 52.
2006]
9
Porras: The "Common Heritage" of Outer Space: Equal Benefits For Most of
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
152 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
was created at a time of bilateral super-power dominance,5 3 but with
new participants in space such as China, Japan, and North Korea, the
situation is now much more complex. Against this backdrop, nations
came together concerning the idea that there must be peaceful coop-
eration in space separate from any struggles on Earth.
The first international treaty regarding space was the Limited-
Test-Ban Treaty.54 This treaty is an international agreement concern-
ing the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and
under water. The two major nuclear powers of the day, the United
States and the Soviet Union, along with the United Kingdom agreed
that there should be a general disarmament and a ban on nuclear test-
ing in environments that could spread radioactive debris. 6 Over 120
other nations agreed to sign the treaty with a few notable exceptions.57
Because the treaty focuses on use and not presence in space, it is not
considered one of the corpusjuris spatalis5 8 However, it is an impor-
tant document because of the novel limitations put on military opera-
tions and the new approach to space exploration adopted by the
world's military super powers.59
A. Corpus Juris Spatialis
The body of modern law that is considered to govern space law
consists of five international treaties: the Outer Space Treaty, the Res-
cue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Conven-
tion, and the Moon Treaty.6" While more treaties are coming into ex-
istence, these five are regarded by most as the controlling authority for
human activities in outer space. 61 The principles of the corpus juris
spatialis involve new commitments to international cooperation in or-
der to achieve a shared vision of space exploration.62 International
53. Id. at 55.
54. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 7.
55. Id. art. I(l)(a).
56. See id.
57. See Petras, supra note 8, at 148. France and China refused to ratify the treaty and
continue using nuclear altitude testing. This rapprochement has limited the effect of the Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and
Principles on Space Law, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
61. See id.
62. See id.
10
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cooperation will become an increasing norm vital to cooperative ac-
tivities in -space. Because the forum in outer space will operate under
new concepts of the international community, perhaps the term for
this area of law should be changed to "extranational law."
1. Outer Space Treaty
The Americans, Russians, and British came together in 1967 to
write the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). 63 This treaty is the most sig-
nificant of any because it created the framework from which all inter-
national space law is derived.'
The treaty begins by recognizing the common interests of all peo-
ple in the peaceful exploration and use of space; that it should benefit
all despite economic or scientific development.65 The Outer Space
Treaty establishes the belief that co-operation in space "will contribute
to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening
of friendly relations between states and peoples. 66 To date, there is
no precise definition of "peaceful purpose. "67
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty lists what has become known
as the three freedom principles. 68 The "freedom of access" principle
ensures that all mankind shall benefit from exploration and use of
outer space, despite economic or scientific development, that outer
space "shall be the province of all mankind." 69 Second, every state
shall have "freedom of exploration"70 and free access to all celestial
bodies.71 This elimination of property rights is similar to the princi-
ples in the Antarctic Treaty, discussed later.7" Finally, all nations have
63. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, proclamation.
64. Petras, supra note 8, at 150.
65. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, proclamation.
66. Id.
67. See generally Petras, supra note 8, page 168-171 (discussing the evolving interpre-
tation of the term "peaceful purpose").
68. See Petras, supra note 8, at 153 (listing the three freedom principles as: "(1) free-
dom of access, (2) freedom of exploration, and (3) freedom of use"). See also Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 5, art. I para. 2.
69. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. I para. 1. Does this mean everyone shall
benefit the way everyone does from cancer research, in other words those who can afford it?
70. Petras, supra note 8, at 153.
71. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. I para. 2.
72. See Antarctic Treaty arts. I(1), H, IV(2), December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]. All signatories are forbidden from asserting any
new claims of sovereignty over any part of Antarctica, and military use is strictly prohibited,
2006]
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"freedom of use ' 73 for scientific investigation, along with a pledge to
facilitate co-operation among states.74
These principles, while noble, are also very broad and difficult to
interpret. Until now, capacity and practice have defined these terms.
For example, there has been a debate as to whether the "Common In-
terest" Principle implies equitable sharing of benefits or simply en-
sures equal access to space.75  Historically, the only countries that
were affected by this notion were those that could reach space,7 6 but
the implications are growing with the dissemination of technology.
Article II is similar to the treaties that govern Antarctica, stating
that there will be "no national appropriation ... of sovereignty" over
space or any celestial body.77 This prohibits government appropria-
tion of territory. However, critics have disagreed as to whether this
clause extends to private individuals.7 8 While there is some indication
of what property law in space will be, the extreme inaccessibility of
space may require private ventures into space, and that will mean
profit incentives. Entrepreneurs will need to know what is to be
gained.
Another problem is that the boundaries between outer space and
air space have yet to be defined by any specific altitude.79 Nations al-
ready claim airspace for the purpose of controlling airplane traffic, 0
but they all have free access for scientific research and tourism. Id.; R. Thomas Rankin,
Space Tourism: Fanny Packs, Ugly T-Shirts, and the Law in Outer Space, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 695, 699 (2003). The body of law governing Antarctica will be used to analyze the fu-
ture of International Space Law. Rankin, supra note 76, at 696.
73. Petras, supra note 8, at 153.
74. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. I para. 3; see also Antarctic Treaty, supra
note 72. This begs the question: to what extent will nations help themselves versus each
other?
75. Petras, supra note 8, at 151-52.
76. See id.
77. Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. HI, with Antarctic Treaty, supra note
72, art. IV(2).
78. Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Properly Rights: From the Earth
to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 28 (2005). Some critics argue that by means of citizenship,
the restrictions are extended to private individuals. Id.
79. See Petras, supra note 8, at 154. There are two schools of thought on what to do
with the outer space boundary. The first, "spacialists" feel that an international law should be
passed to establish a boundary. Id. Others, "functionalists" feel that the specific activity
should be governed by the nature of the activity. Id. at 154-55. For now, spacialists and func-
tionalists agree that satellites create a minimum boundary because it is accepted that they orbit
in space. Id. The two camps also look to the functioning definition of "space object" as any
object designed to enter outer space. Id.
80. See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. I, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. 1951,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] ("The contracting States recognize that
every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory");
see also id. art. 6 ("No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the
12
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but this model will not serve in outer space.81 As aviation technology
continues to improve, the difference between airplane and space shut-
tle will be relevant to the type of law employed.8 2 As the law stands,
there are drastic differences in the legal principles applied to these two
situations.83
States also need to know where airspace and outer space border so
that nations will know the vertical limits of their territory. Recently,
the tiny South-Pacific nation of Tonga created a dilemma by attempt-
ing to secure exclusive rights for geostationary orbits." This right
may open the door to a free market in space territory, where states
would claim sovereignty over geostationary orbits and then sell them
to the highest bidder. After difficult negotiations with the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
Tonga was permitted to lawfully retain only six of sixteen orbits.8 5
This outcome shows that there are profitable interests in space that
states are willing to forego in the interest of retaining a common heri-
tage in space.
Another critical provision of the Outer Space Treaty is found in
Article III, which provides that parties to the treaty will act "in accor-
dance with international law, including the Charter of the United Na-
tions, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security
and promoting international co-operation and understanding.18 6 How-
territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of
that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization.").
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating that there is no sovereignty in
space).
82. See 49 U.S.C. § 70102(8) (2006) ("'launch vehicle' means-(A) a vehicle built to
operate in, or place a payload or human beings in outer space; and (B) a suborbital rocket.");
Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regula-
tions; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,617 (Sept. 19, 2000) (defining Reusable Launch Vehicles
as those vehicles intended to return from Earth's orbit or outer space relatively intact). At no
point do the regulations make a specific altitude distinction besides that the vehicles are meant
to operate in outer space. 49 U.S.C. § 70102(8); see also Commercial Space Transportation
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
56,618 (Sept. 19, 2000); Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty fifth session,
A/AC.105/871, 91 (noting legal uncertainty concerning the application of space law and air
law).
83. Compare Chicago Convention, supra note 80, arts. 1, 6 with Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 5, art. EI.
84. Jonathan Ira Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga's Claiming of Sixteen Geostationary Or-
bital Sites and the Implications for U.S. Space Policy, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 915, 915
(2003). A geostationary satellite is one that orbits the Earth at the same constant rate as the
turning of the Earth. This proves useful for creating constant satellite coverage in one area.
Id. at 915 n. 1.
85. Id. at 915-16.
86. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. ItT.
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ever there are certain principles that cannot apply due to the special
environment of outer space,8 7 such as those concerning property.
Military activities are absolutely forbidden in outer space by Arti-
cle IV.88 The interpretations of this section have been broad. For ex-
ample, Article IV expressly prohibits military testing and placing nu-
clear weapons in space,89 but the wording was intentionally crafted to
exclude intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other types of
less destructive weapons.9" Also the use of military personnel for sci-
entific investigation is not prohibited.91 Thus, the definition of prohib-
ited military conduct remains arguable. The limitations on nuclear
testing reiterate the principles of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and ex-
tend the limitations to nuclear testing of any kind.92
Articles V through VIII of the Outer Space Treaty deal with mu-
tual responsibilities of governments regarding astronauts and launch
objects. Astronauts are labeled as "envoys of mankind" and are guar-
anteed "all possible assistance in the event of an accident. . . -91 The
same follows for objects launched into space that crash back to the
Earth. 94 In the spirit of international cooperation, every state is re-
quired to aid in the recovery of astronauts, technology, and to fore-
warn any parties who might be in danger from objects in space. 95 Any
state launching an object into space retains jurisdiction over the ob-
ject 96 as well as liability for any damage it may cause. 97 Private enti-
ties conducting activities in space must receive permission from an
appropriate state body that will then oversee the activities. 98 Thus,
parties to the treaty that have no space program accept a duty, but it
remains to be seen what kind of benefit they will receive in exchange
for their aid.9
Of these provisions, Article VI contains important language for
commercial prospects. Article VI requires all non-governmental enti-
87. Petras, supra note 8, at 156.
88. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV.
89. Id. art. IV para. 1.
90. Petras, supra note 8, at 157-58.
91. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV para. 2.
92. See id.; see also Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 7.
93. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. V para. 1.
94. See id. art. VIII (granting launching states jurisdiction over objects in space).
95. Id. art. V.
96. Id. art. VIE.
97. Id. art. VII.
98. Id. art. VI.
99. SMITH, supra note 10, at 91-92.
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ties to be authorized and supervised by a member state."° Thus, the
Outer Space Treaty grants governments the power to regulate inde-
pendent space activities and appears to provide joint liability for such
activities. 101
The Outer Space Treaty includes provisions that attempt to elabo-
rate on "Common Interest" and "Co-operation." Article IX states that
parties to the treaty "shall be guided by the principle of co-operation"
while keeping "due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the [t]reaty."' 10 2 If a planned activity could interfere
with other parties' use of space, then States Parties can request an in-
ternational consultation before the activity occurs. 10 3 States Parties to
the treaty are encouraged to cooperate in scientific endeavors. Spe-
cifically, they must allow states equal opportunity to observe space
flights,"°4 notify the scientific community of any activities conducted
in space (including results), 105 and share space stations and equipment
on a reciprocal basis. 06 Achieving international consensus on precise
definitions for these terms is difficult enough, but it is even more
complex due to the dual nature of the technology involved. 107
The core terms of the treaty conclude by parceling jurisdiction
over all activities conducted in space, on the Moon, or on any other
celestial bodies. 08 The treaty has been adopted by a majority of the
U.N. members' 1° and has been accepted as the founding body of inter-
national space law."10
2. Rescue Agreement
Treaties aiding space endeavors have helped make many develop-
ing states a part of space exploration. Through the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
100. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. IX.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. X.
105. ld. art. XI.
106. Id. art. XII.
107. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 175-76.
108. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. XIII para. 2.
109. As of January 1, 2006, ninety-eight member states had ratified the Outer Space
Treaty with an additional twenty-seven member states as signatories. United Nations Office
for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, Outer Space
Treaty, http://unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
110. See Petras, supra note 8, at 149.
20061
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Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement), signatories pledge,
among other things, to assist in the safe return of astronauts or space
objects to their home country in the event of an emergency landing. II
The treaty was drafted to promote international cooperation, and as-
pire to prevent "international conflict.""' 2  Most of the terms in the
Rescue Agreement give responsibilities to "contracting parties" that
encounter wayward astronauts within their jurisdictions." 3 While re-
imbursement is guaranteed, 14 nowhere else is there any mention of
profitable interest for a state that does not participate in outer space
activities. "5 This is an interesting fact since only five of the sixty-six
contracting parties are space-faring nations. "16
The Rescue Agreement expands on Article V of the Outer Space
Treaty and clarifies the duties owed to stranded astronauts and gov-
ernments trying to recover errant technology."7 For the most part, the
Rescue Agreement is viewed as being a reaffirmation of principles al-
ready established in the Outer Space Treaty.
3. The Liability Convention and the Space Registry
Because many of the technological advancements in space are
achieved through trial and error, a great deal of risk must be as-
sumed."' There are now more than 9,000 pieces of man-made space
debris floating unfettered in Earth's orbit." 9 The Outer Space Treaty
1 11. See generally Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-U.S.S.R., Apr. 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
112. Compare id., with United Nations: Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S.
3, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
113. See, e.g., Rescue Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2 ("If, owing to accident, dis-
tress, emergency or unintended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under
the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, it shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue
them and render them all necessary assistance").
114. Id. art. 5(5) ("Expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a
space object or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne by
the launching authority").
115. See id.
116. See generally supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
117. Robert A. Ramney, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 86 (2000); Petras, supra note 8, at 163; compare Rescue Agree-
ment, supra note 111, with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. V.
118. Cf. Molly K. Macauley, Flying in the Face of Uncertainty: Human Risk in Space
Activities, 6 CI. J. INT'L L. 131, 133 (2005) (stating that "spaceflight remains risky even after
exhaustive, detailed, and careful investigation, extensive reengineering, and changes in com-
munication").
119. J.C. Liou & N.L. Johnson, Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris, SCIENCE, Jan. 20,
16
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addresses liability in Articles VI ("States Parties to the Treaty shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space... . -);120 Article VII (States Parties to the treaty that launch or
procure the launch of any object into space assume liability for dam-
age caused by those objects); 2 1 and Article IX (States Parties must
avoid contaminating or adversely affecting the Earth's environment
when conducting activities in space). 122 The Convention on Interna-
tional Liability (Liability Convention) augments these articles in the
Outer Space Treaty, 13 and expressly attributes liability for damages to
the country that launched the object into space. 24
This treaty contains a variant of the "Common Interest" Principle,
but it is reworded to recognize "the common interest of all mankind in
furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses.' 12  This language may be narrower than the Outer Space
Treaty's, 126 suggesting that perhaps the "Common Interest" is limited
to peaceful activities in space. In other words, "Common Heritage"
refers to the passive benefit of not being attacked from space. This
favors the equitable access interpretation of "Common Interest." The
convention also includes a refined definition of who is a state actor,
namely any international intergovernmental organization conducting
space activities that accepts the rights and duties of the Liability Con-
vention. 121
To ensure that there is no doubt as to who launched a specific ob-
ject into space, the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Space Registry) created a database at the United Nations that requires
notification before a launch can take place. ' 28 The Space Registry and
2006, at 340.
120. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI.
121. Id. art. VII.
122. Id. art. IX.
123. See Petras, supra note 8, at 164-65.
124. Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, art. n1. [hereinafter Liability Convention].
125. Id. Proclamation.
126. Compare Liability Convention, supra note 124 (stating that the treaty recognizes
"the common interest of all mankind in furthering the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes" (emphasis added)), with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5 (stating that the
treaty recognizes "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes" (emphasis added)).
127. Liability Convention, supra note 124, art. XXII(l).
128. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695,
1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Space Registry]. Originally, Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty appointed jurisdiction of an object in space to the state where the object was registered.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII.
2006]
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the Liability Convention require that launching states assume absolute
responsibility for damages.'29 Again, the "Common Interest" Princi-
ple is repeated as is found in the Liability Convention, adding more
support to the argument that "Common Interest" is limited to equitable
access. 130
4. Moon Treaty
There are few states that have the means to begin reaping the
benefits of outer space and celestial bodies. Less developed states will
probably have access to space one day, but because of their late arrival
to the industry, there will be few benefits left untapped.13' To address
this concern, two proposed treaties were presented to COPUOS con-
cerning the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies; one from Ar-
gentina (backed by the United States), and another drafted by the So-
viet Union.'32  These drafts were surrounded by controversy
concerning the world's less developed nations' desire to preserve the
status of "Common Interest" benefits in an industry they could not yet
access.'33 The Soviet Union's version was adopted as the first draft of
the United Nations: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).134
This treaty is meant to govern activities on the Moon so that all
states will have equal "use of the moon and other celestial bodies," to-
day and tomorrow, and to ensure that the Moon remains free from in-
ternational conflict.'35 The treaty attempted to create an international
regime to oversee exploitation in space as technology developed. 3 6
However, this idea would also constitute a freezing of commercial ex-
129. Space Registry, supra note 128 ("Recalling further that the [c]onvention on inter-
national liability for damage caused by space objects ... establishes international rules and
procedures concerning the liability of launching States for damages caused by their space ob-
jects"); see also Lability Convention, supra note 124, art. II ("A launching State shall be ab-
solutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of
the Earth or to aircraft in flight").
130. See Space Registry, supra note 128.
131. See Art Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L.
3, 20 (1979) (discussing the idea that industrialized countries' access to space resources
should be limited "so that developing countries have a chance to" benefit from those re-
sources).
132. Id. at7.
133. See Gabrynowictz, supra note 19, at 1046-47.
134. Dula, supra note 131, at 1, 7. The draft that the Soviet Union submitted underwent
several revisions before COPUOS adapted it into the Moon Treaty 1979. Id. at 7.
135. See Moon Treaty, supra note 112.
136. See id. art. 11.
18
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ploitation of the Moon until such a governing body could be cre-
ated.'37 Through a series of negotiations, the United States was able to
convince the U.N. General Assembly to impose neither a moratorium
on commercial growth,'38 nor a limit on exploitation done in further-
ance of "scientific investigations."' 3 9 Despite the compromise of the
Soviets and other third world countries, the Moon Treaty has not been
ratified by the United States and has subsequently received little rec-
ognition. 140
B. Additional International Agreements
There are three prominent international agreements that do not fall
under the category of space law but can be viewed as instructive au-
thority due to similarities with the outer space treaties: the Antarctic
Treaty; the Seabed Treaty; and the 1998 International Space Station
Agreement. These treaties require member states to agree to pursue
only "peaceful purposes," 141 restrict claims of sovereignty in undevel-
oped environments,'42 and imply a "Common Interest" for all man-
kind."' The Antarctic Treaty is often cited as an indication of what
137. Dula, supra note 131, at 16 (discussing the limit on commercial development on
the Moon by U.S. corporations if the United States ratifies the Moon Treaty).
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
140. See Sattler, supra note 78, at 30; Petras, supra note 8, at 167; see also U.N. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty-
fifth session, held in Vienna from 3 to 13 April 2006, 49th Sess., [ 34, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/871 (2006). The number of members ratifying the five treaties of space law de-
scends with each successive treaty, starting at twenty-seven members of the Outer Space
Treaty and only four members for the Moon Treaty. Id.
141. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 72 ("Antarctica shall ... be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes ...."); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-
soil Thereof, openedfor signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinaf-
ter Seabed Treaty] (limiting activity on seabed floor to peaceful purposes); ISS Agreement,
supra note 32, art. 1(1) (stating that the objective of the agreement is "a permanently [inhabit-
able] civil international space station for "peaceful purposes"').
142. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 72, art. IV(2) ("No new claim, or enlargement of
an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted ...."); c.f. Seabed
Treaty, supra note 141, arts. I, n (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone art. HI, Sept. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (generally prohibiting a state
from exercising control beyond twelve miles from its coast)); ISS Agreement, supra note 32,
art. 2(2)(c) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as. . . constituting a basis for as-
serting a claim to national appropriation over outer space or any portion of outer space.")
(emphasis added).
143. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 72 (recognizing interests of all mankind); Seabed
Treaty, supra note 141 (recognizing common interests of all mankind); c.f. ISS Agreement,
supra note 32 (stating that the international space station will be developed according to first
four treaties in the corpus juris spatialis).
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"peaceful purpose" might mean in the context of outer space.'" The
1998 International Space Station Agreement is an ongoing experiment
with what can be achieved through an international effort in space.
1. The Antarctic Treaty
The Antarctic Treaty was written to ensure that Antarctica would
be used for peaceful, scientific purposes. 45 This treaty also prevents
states from making new claims of territorial sovereignty."4  The
"Common Heritage" Principal is reflected in Article III which gener-
ally requires that, to the greatest extent feasible, parties to the treaty
will openly share information, and personnel, and make scientific ob-
servations freely available.147 This language is repeated in the Interna-
tional Space Station Agreement, but that agreement only requires
sharing of information to the extent necessary to assemble and operate
the space station.148
2. The Seabed Treaty
The Treaty on Prohibition of the Placement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) 49 can be highly in-
structive for space law. This treaty sought to curb the growing danger
of nuclear weapons and to prevent an arms race on the seafloor. 150
The concept of "Common Interest" is clearly set forth at the outset of
the agreement,' but in this treaty the benefit is specifically limited to
"peaceful purposes" as being an end unto itself. 15 2 According to this
144. See Petras, supra note 8, at 168-69. The Antarctic Treaty "is often cited as the
most authoritative aid for the interpretation of the term "peaceful" in the outer space con-
text .... Id.
145. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 72.
146. Id. art. 1V(2).
147. Id. art. III(1).
148. See ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 19(1)-(2) (requiring the Partners to transfer
all data necessary to fulfill responsibilities, but excluding transfer of any technical data or
goods that might contravene national laws or regulations).
149. Seabed Treaty, supra note 141.
150. See id.
151. Id. ("The States Parties to this Treaty... regozniz[es] the common interest of
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for
peaceful purposes .... ").
152. See Ramney, supra note 117, at 65-66, (discussing the "permissible" nature of
space law). If an activity is not expressly prohibited, space law assumes that it is permitted.
Id. One example is that nuclear weapons are generally prohibited in space, while other weap-
ons of "lesser destructive capabilities" are assumed permitted because a lack of specific pro-
20
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language, respecting "Common Heritage" would be a passive duty for
space-faring nations, with peace being the benefit in and of itself.
3. The International Space Station Agreement
The latest agreement that has brought international actors together
in outer space is the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil
International Space Station (ISS Agreement) that sets out the rules of
the International Space Station." 3 Following early attempts by the
United States and the Soviet Union to design national space sta-
tions, 114 several international bodies including Canada, the European
Space Agency, Japan, Russia, and the United States, set forth an
agreement for cooperative efforts in creating an orbiting scientific re-
search station. 155 Because the space station is currently governed by
international cooperation, the International Space Station and ISS
Agreement serve as experiments on what can be achieved in space
with multinational actors working closely together.
The ISS Agreement begins by recalling all of the treaties found in
the corpus juris spatialis minus the Moon Treaty. 5 6 The terms of the
ISS Agreement set forth rules for cooperative use.157 Individual states
retain jurisdiction over separate activities while a collective body co-
ordinates station maintenance activities. 158 This agreement is unique
because it defines how parties to the agreement should cooperate. 15 9
In anticipation of disputes over the sharing of discoveries on the
space station, there is an article addressing the exchange of data and
goods."6 The structure of this article is based on the idea that a state
retains jurisdiction over the components it has contributed to the space
station. 161 All technical data deemed necessary to operate the station
must be transferred to the necessary partners of the treaty.' 62 States
also promise to make "best efforts" to share any data with other part-
hibition. Id.
153. ISS Agreement, supra note 32.
154. Petras, supra note 8, at 136; GATLAND, supra note 29, at 221, 230.
155. Petras, supra note 8, at 138; see also ISS Agreement, supra note 32.
156. ISS Agreement, supra note 32.
157. See id. art. 1.
158. See generally id. arts. 5-7.
159. See id. art. 7 (requiring managing bodies to be responsible for planning and coor-
dinating activities that will make research and development equally safe and accessible for
parties to the agreement).
160. See id. art. 19.
161. ld. art. 5.
162. Id. art. 19 para. 1.
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ners to the ISS Agreement, simultaneously agreeing to get the consent
of the group before transferring data to parties outside of the agree-
ment. 1
63
This treaty gives two more fixed points of what "Common Heri-
tage" might mean. At a bare minimum, states are willing to openly
share necessary benefits to operate joint ventures, and for more sensi-
tive information, there must be national consent."6 The International
Space Station and ISS Agreement present potential models for future
space partnerships. The only problem is that states are required to
contribute to the partnership before they can become active beneficiar-
ies of space exploration. What is the common heritage of those that
cannot contribute?
C. United States Space Law
Being one of the foremost leaders in space exploration, 165 the
United States has the most developed body of legislation and multina-
tional agreements that govern the activities of public and private citi-
zens in space.l6 Most of the United States' domestic space law has
been aimed at two objectives: to protect U.S. national security inter-
ests and to promote commercial space launches in the private sector. 167
The recognition of these two considerations implies that a balance
must be struck between them. The U.S. government does not want to
stifle a burgeoning industry, but national security cannot be compro-
mised at the expense of new treaties.
1. Promoting the Commercial Sector of Space Exploration
One purpose of U.S. domestic space law is "to promote growth
and entrepreneurial activity" through the peaceful use of outer
space. 16 8 Like the development of space law, much of the U.S. legisla-
163. Id. art. 19 para. 2.
164. Id. art. 19 para. 2 (stating that partners shall meet the requests for transfers of data,
but national laws still apply).
165. See Space Hearing, supra note 3 (statements of Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator and
Marcia Smith, specialist in aerospace technology policy from the Congressional Research
Service).
166. See generally United States Space Laws and Regulations, China Security (pro-
duced by World Security Institute), available at http://www.wsichina.org/subpro
gram.cfm?subprograrnid= I &charid=1; see also CSLA, supra note 5.
167. 49 U.S.C. § 70103 (b)(l) (2006); see also Human Space Flight Regulations for
Crew and Space Flight Participants, 14 U.S.C. § 401 (2006) [hereinafter FAA Regulations].
168. CSLA, supra note 5, § 401(b)(1)-(4).
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tion governing space has been enacted out of necessity. As technol-
ogy changes, the law adapts. As new legislation is being drafted,
Congress is careful to leave ample room for private industry to
grow.169
a. NASA
Space activities have mostly been limited to military operations
and a government funded civilian branch, the National Aeronautics
Space Administration (NASA). 7 ' Passed in 1958, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Act (NASA Act)' 7' symbolized the United States'
renewed commitment to dominance in space.'72 But the United States
wanted to ensure peace in space as well, so President Eisenhower
made a point to separate the United States' commercial civilian efforts
from the Department of Defense's military research.'73
Similar to international space law, the NASA Act opens with a
declaration that U.S. activities in space should be "devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind."'74 This language suggests
that all activities in space should be carried out on behalf of all man-
kind.
b. ComSat and INTELSAT
Another important act aimed at unifying international efforts is
the ComSat Act.'75 The purpose of this act is to develop profitable
commercial telecommunications technology176 and for the United
States to foster and support global commercial communications satel-
lite systems.'77 The Communications Satellite Corporation (ComSat)
169. See id. The purposes of this act were "to promote economic growth and entrepre-
neurial activity through use of space ... for peaceful purposes; to encourage the.. . private
sector to provide launch vehicles"; to provide the Secretary of Transportation with overseeing
authority; and "to facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space trans-
portation infrastructure... "(emphasis added). Id.
170. See Gabrynowicz, supra note 19, at 1047-48.
171. Id. at 1047.
172. SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 52-54.
173. Id. at 54; see, e.g., National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §
2451 (b) (2006) (reserving "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development
of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States .... for the De-
partment of Defense).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a).
175. Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
176. Communications Satellite Corporation v. FCC, 611 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
177. Lisa Parks, Communications Satellite Corporation, The Museum of Broadcast
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was a private company that provided wholesale satellite circuitry to
other communication carriers, including governments of developing
nations.'78 To broaden the impact of such an effort Congress author-
ized ComSat to take part in the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) to help developing nations gain
access to telecommunications through subsidies.'79 It accomplishes
this task by offering affordable, uniform rates all over the world for
telecommunications network service. 80 Interestingly, the members of
INTELSAT have all agreed not to conduct activities that will harm
other members of the corporation. '81
c. Commercial Space Launch Act
The United States passed its first commercial space legislation in
1984 with the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA). 82 The find-
ings and purposes of this act can be categorized into two distinct inter-
ests of the United States:
1) To "protect the public health and safety, safety of prop-
erty, and national security interests and foreign policy in-
terests of the United States;"'183 and
2) To "encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space
launches and reentries by the private sector. ' ' 84
This legislation anticipates commercial growth and economic
prosperity in space, so it tries to regulate only those areas that are a
threat to national security and safety.'85 The only finding that overlaps
Communications, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/C/htmlC/communicationlcommunica
tion.htm; see 47 U.S.C. § 70 1(a).
178. See Parks, supra note 177. ComSat was created to offset a debate over whether air
space should be owned by private companies or the government. Eventually, the government
created a private business that would be owned by private companies and by the government.
Shareholders and the President of the United States elect board members. See generally id.
179. See generally Ezor, supra note 84, at 924-26; see also Parks supra note 177 (not-
ing also that the United States owns fifty percent of INTELSAT).
180. Ezor, supra note 84, at 926.
181. Id. at 925; see 47 U.S.C. § 761 (b)(l) (2000). When considering applications or
licenses for using INTELSAT resources (including those from INTELSAT and their succes-
sors), this statute directs the FCC to first determine if United States telecommunication mar-
kets competition will be harmed by an INTELSAT application. The same determination is
then applied to entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction operated by INTELSAT. Id.
182. See generally CSLA, supra note 5.
183. Id. § 70101(b)(3) (granting the Secretary of Transportation the authority to pre-
scribe any regulations to "protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national
security interests and foreign policy interests of the United States").
184. Id. § 70103 (b)(1) (using this language to embody the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's duties under the CSLA).
185. See id. § 70101 (a)(2) (finding that economic achievements in space are becoming
24
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both categories is the first, which states that the peaceful use of outer
space is of great value to "all mankind."'' 86 But these benefits will rely
greatly on the participation of state governments.'87 By this declara-
tion, the U.S. government has accepted responsibility for the growth
of the commercial sector within the country.
To enable its goals, the CSLA gives the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) the authority to oversee commercial space launches that
involve U.S. interests.'88 The DOT is charged with issuing permits
and licenses to launch and perform reentry operations in order to "pro-
tect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national secu-
rity and foreign policy interests of the United States."' 89
Of the CSLA provisions, § 70104 is particularly notable in terms
of defining what might be a benefit of space. Section 70104 impedes
U.S. citizen participation in space programs outside of the reach of the
United States. 9° This section also requires licenses or permits for
U.S. citizens to perform commercial launch or reentry.' 9' Any citizen
who does not obtain permission from the DOT may not conduct
launch or reentry operations inside or outside of the United States, ab-
sent an agreement to the contrary between the United States and a for-
eign government. 192 By this enactment, the United States restricts the
availability of human expertise to the rest of the world. Consequently,
all states are entitled to develop their human understanding of space,
but the United States is not required to share human resources ac-
tively.
d. FAA Human Space Flight Regulations
Recently, the U.S. government charged the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) with the task of creating rules and guidelines for
space flight crews and participants. 93 There are specific rules and
significant and offer potential for growth).
186. See id. § 70101 (a)(1).
187. Id. § 70101 (a)(9).
188. Id. § 70101(b)(3) (granting the head of the DOT, the secretary of transportation,
the authority to issue licenses or permits for launch and reentry into the atmosphere).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 70104(a).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participation, 70
Fed. Reg. 77,262 (Dec. 29, 2005) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 401, 415 et al.) (presenting rules
proposed by the FAA under authority provided by the Commercial Space Launch Amend-
ments Act of 2004, 49 U.S.C. § 70103(d) (2006)).
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regulations for flight crews and different rules for ground crews of a
space launch operation. 19 4 The regulations also contain proposed rules
for space tourists, the most notable provision being that of the "fly at
your own risk" disclaimer.' 95 The ultimate goal of the FAA is to regu-
late the least number of areas possible, while maintaining safety stan-
dards; thereby leaving ample room for the space industry to grow
safely and responsibly. 196
Looking at these rules, one can see how space benefits might be
shared in a way similar to air space. Planes travel all over the world
with varying degrees of technological advancements; they possess
dual-use applications, such as tourism and military. 197 Yet, there is in-
ternational coordination to regulate the use of air space.' 98
2. Protecting National Security Through International Efforts
Part of maintaining national security requires maintaining a com-
petitive edge in space technology. 199 How will scientific discoveries be
shared with the rest of the world, particularly those conducted by pri-
vate entities in space? Under U.S. leadership, two primary technology
control agreements designed to keep sensitive technology out of dan-
gerous hands have emerged: the Military Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement.?°
194. Id. at 77,264 (delineating flight crews, remote operators, and other ground crews).
195. Id. at 77,269 (stating that space flight is inherently risky and requiring space flight
participants to waive claims with the FAA).
196. Telephone interview with Linda Montgomery, Senior Counsel for the Federal
Aviation administration (Mar. 17, 2006).
197. See Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and International Law:
Chicago Opus, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 885, 900 (2001) ("Airplanes have the inherent capacity
for dual use. Civil airplanes can certainly be used for military missions and vice versa.").
198. See, e.g., J. Scott Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce National Resource,
22 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 253 n.4 (1994) ("There is already considerable international cooperation
in air traffic control.").
199. See Space Memo, supra note 9 ("Achieving space and information superiority will
help to counter an adversary's ability to command and control its forces.").
200. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 189-90; see also Karim K. Shehadeh, Note, The
Wassenaar Arrangement and Encryption Exports: An Ineffective Export Control Regime that
Compromises United States' Economic Interests, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 271,272-73 (1999).
"[A] United States-led group of thirty-three nations adopted the Wassenaar Arrangement ....
Signatories to Wassenaar agree to cooperate with each other to limit the export of conven-
tional weapons and dual-use technologies to politically unstable nations or regions." Id.; Wyn
Q. Bowen, U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade, 1987-
1997, THE NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1997, at 21, 23.
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a. Military Technology Control Regime
The MTCR was created amidst growing international fears about
proliferation of nuclear weapons.20' Negotiated during the Reagan
Administration and followed by the United States and other Group of
Seven (G-7) states, 20 2 the MTCR is a "voluntary arrangement" which
controls the transfer of equipment and technology that could be used
to develop nuclear-capable missiles. 203 The MTCR lists several fac-
tors that should be taken into account when considering applications
to transfer controlled items.2" These factors include "nuclear prolif-
eration concerns," as well as capabilities and objectives of an appli-
cant's space and missile program.2 5 If technology is a benefit of outer
space exploration, these factors could be considered as guidelines for
what types of technology may be shared among any international
states. The MTCR is not intended to hinder space exploration, so ex-
changes of technology are freely permissible between members of the
MTCR and states that can prove peaceful intentions. 206 However, this
agreement is limited to transfers between governments. 20 7 There is no
mention of private entities exchanging information.2 8
One major drawback to the MTCR has actually been lack of en-
forcement and implementation by parties to the agreement. 209 Nations
that were not members, such as the Soviet Union and China, could
easily take advantage of industry demands by unauthorized develop-
ing nations.210 To help combat further proliferation, the member states
agreed upon a "no undercut" policy, stating that if one state denies
transfer of technology to another country, all members should deny
them as well.2 1'
201. Bowen, supra note 200, at 22-23.
202. Id. at 23.
203. Id.; see also Waldrop, supra note 21, at 190; MTCR, supra note 50, para. 1.
204. MTCR, supra note 50, para. 3.
205. Id.
206. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 190.
207. MTCR, supra note 50, para. 3.
208. See generally id.
209. Bowen, supra note 200, at 24-25.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 190.
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b. Wassenaar Arrangement
To compliment the MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement2"2 pre-
vents dual-use goods and technologies from reaching terrorists." 3
This policy meets the challenges of "post-Cold-War changes in the in-
ternational environment."2"4 This agreement's value lies in the list of
technology that is restricted to certain states, such as rocket technol-
ogy.215 By restricting the types of technology that can be shared, a le-
gal limitation is placed on "Common Heritage." Equitable benefits in
space do not include potentially dangerous military technology. How-
ever, this document has proven of little value because states are not
legally bound to comply. 216
IV. MAN'S "COMMON HERITAGE": A HYBRID OF EQUITIES
Defining "Common Heritage" has been a narrowing process for
the international community. The Outer Space Treaty proposed a
broad ideal that has been refined and tailored by actors in outer
space.2"7 So is "Common Heritage" a reference to equitable benefits
or equitable access? Like most legal questions, the resulting answer is
a mixture of both ideas and is dependent upon the situation.
A. The Evolution of "Common Heritage" in Practice
The impetus of space exploration occurred during a time of con-
flict and fear. 2 18  The world's superpowers were left in a mindset
where technological superiority meant survival.1 9 When the first
agreements concerning outer space were reached, space exploration
was conducted in a manner of strict equitable access. 220 The Cold War
standoff resulted in an understanding that states would have free ac-
cess to space so long as there were no military intentions.22'
212. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies [hereinafter Wassenaar Arrangement] (Jan. 2006),
http://www.wassenaar.org (follow "Basic Documents Compilation" hyperlink).
213. Id. at 1.
214. See Kenneth A. Dursht, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and
the Wassenaar Arrangement, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 1079, 1109 (1998).
215. See Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 212, at 8, 18.
216. Dursht, supra note 214, at 1113.
217. See discussion supra Part IMI.
218. LAUNIUS, supra note 22, at 17-18.
219. See generally id. at 17, 24-26.
220. See id. at 27-28; Gabrynowicz, supra note 19, at 1042.
221. LAUNIUS, supra note 22, at 27-28.
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As cooperation in space has progressed, "Common Heritage" ex-
panded from equitable access to a limited form of equitable bene-
fits. 222  States that can contribute to space development may share
equally in benefits so long as that development does not involve sensi-
tive dual-use technology. 23  The ISS Agreement functions under this
scheme. 24 Where technology is relevant to the direct operations of
the space station, sharing is mandatory.225 If technical data is classi-
fied, all parties to the transfer must reach an agreement. 26 This aspect
of the agreement aligns with the concept that all member states have a
national security interest when military technology is being shared.227
B. The Evolution of "Common Heritage" on Paper
Space law has come to reflect an adoption of a blended "Common
Heritage" Principle. The Outer Space Treaty purports a broad princi-
ple that is increasingly narrowed by subsequent legislation. 228  The
Rescue Agreement is the only international legislation that suggests
equitable benefits to all.229 Under the Rescue Agreement, responsibil-
ity is imparted to all parties, 230 and where there is a duty there is an
implied benefit.23' If an astronaut is an envoy of all mankind, then his
missions are on behalf of all mankind.232 This strengthens every
state's duty towards astronauts and their home states.
222. See generally discussion supra Part M (describing the evolution of the "Common
Heritage" Principle in space law).
223. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 175.
224. See generally ISS Agreement, supra note 32 (indicating that the space station is
intended to benefit all of the Partners). "The Space Station together with its additions of evo-
lutionary capability shall remain a civil station, and its operation and utilization shall be for
peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law." Id. art. 14(1).
225. See id. art. 19(1).
226. Id. art. 19(3)(c).
227. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 175.
228. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the narrowing of "Common
Heritage" to passive benefits); see also discussion supra Part llI.B.3 (discussing the condi-
tions for benefiting from the International Space Station).
229. See generally Rescue Agreement, supra note I11.
230. See id. art. 2 (imposing a duty on contracting parties to take all possible steps to
rescue a spacecraft in danger).
231. All of Space Law is based on positivist theory of international law that states must
proactively seek to become members of the agreements. See discussion supra Part III. What
incentive would states have to become members of a treaty if they would not receive anything
in return?
232. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. V para. 1.
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But the Liability Convention 233 and Space Registry begin a proc-
ess of restriction on the concept of equitable sharing. 234 The language
of the Liability Convention is restricted to benefits of "peaceful"
uses. 235 This is a passive benefit, meaning that space-faring states do
not need to act positively to help less developed nations enjoy any
benefits of space. They must simply refrain from aggressive actions.
There are no references to any active benefits, like mandatory dis-
semination of technology information or scientific discoveries, found
in the corpus juris spatialis.236 Active benefits are reserved for parties
who can participate in cooperative efforts in space. Language in the
ISS Agreement, for example, suggests that many of the benefits of
that agreement are only to be enjoyed by "Partners. 2 37
For some, the Moon Treaty had been read to define the "Common
Heritage" Principle to mean broad equitable benefits. 38 For others,
while the Moon Treaty had at least given initial effect to the principle,
minimal ratification has rendered the treaty of "relatively little conse-
quence in establishing international space. '239  Instead it seems that
equitable access has come to be the prevailing definition.24 But, co-
operative efforts taking place on the space station have left open the
possibility of sharing of benefits, at least with respect to those who
participate. 241 There is also the occasional effort to share benefits with
all mankind, as is evident, for example, by the efforts of "Intelsat. 242
But such efforts are often met with challenges.243 In sum, the "Com-
233. Liability Convention, supra note 124.
234. Space Registry, supra note 128.
235. See Liability Convention, supra note 124.
236. Compare id., with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII (creating international
liability for damage caused by launch); see also ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 19(1)
(stating that each Partner shall transfer technical data and goods); see also Antarctic Treaty,
supra note 72, art. III (1)(a)-(c).
237. See ISS Agreement, supra note 32, arts. 1(3), 9(3), 9(5). Partners may grant per-
mission for non-partner use, but the power to grant is subject to significant limitations. PC-
tras, supra note 8, at 144-45.
238. See Dula, supra note 131, at 20 (suggesting that the Moon Treaty might be con-
strued as calling for not only distribution of financial benefits but technology as well); see
also Moon Treaty, supra note 112, art. 4(1) ("The exploration and use of the moon shall be
the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.") (emphasis
added).
239. See Petras, supra note 8, at 167.
240. Id. at 152.
241. See supra Part I.B.3.
242. Cf Parks, supra note 177 ("Intelsat ... is a global satellite network that provides
developing nations with access to communications satellites for domestic communications.")
(emphasis added).
243. Id. Parks notes the "difficult challenge of negotiating the often contradictory inter-
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mon Heritage" to be enjoyed by all mankind may be seen modernly as
a hybrid of: equitable access for all, some equitable benefits for all
(excluding non-peaceful purpose technology), and equitable rights to
peace in space.
C. "Common Heritage" as Potential Partnerships
The original concept was that space exploration should be carried
out for the benefit of all mankind in the most expansive sense of the
phrase.2" The emerging definition places limitations on the types of
benefits to be enjoyed by all and suggests distinctions between classes
of "mankind" in space.245 This is dually consistent and contrary to the
original concepts of space law.
The Outer Space Treaty states specifically that outer space explo-
ration should be carried out for the benefit of all people "irrespective
of their degree of economic or scientific" development. 2" This lan-
guage suggests that economic and scientific lagging should not pre-
vent the receipt of benefits. However, if the only parties who are
privileged to benefit from outer space are parties who may participate
in space programs, then the poorest and least developed nations will
not see any benefits apart from not being attacked from outer space.
On the other hand, there is nothing in space law that says states
may not be excluded because of national security concerns. In the in-
terest of national security, states may seek to limit both access to
space and sharing of space technology. If space is to be used for
peaceful purposes, it would seem that denying access and technology
in these instances would be permissible and would not amount to de-
nial of any recognized benefits of space exploration.247 So the modi-
fied idea of "Common Heritage" ignores the less economically devel-
oped nations, but it excludes nations that threaten national security. If
this is the case, then the duty of space-faring states to less developed
nations should be to offer access to space and an opportunity to par-
ticipate peacefully, but not to share technology that enables military
applications.
ests of private enterprise and the public good." Id. Challenges like this are contrary to the
equitable benefits principle because they suggest that less developed nations are only entitled
to what others are willing to spare.
244. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5.
245. See, e.g., supra note 237 (discussing distinctions between Partners and non-
Partners with respect to benefits of the International Space Station).
246. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. I para. 1.
247. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 177-78, 189.
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D. How Should the United States Proceed?
Under modern space law, the United States has a duty to mankind
to offer participation in cooperative efforts to any state that does not
pose a risk to national security.2 48 This definition resembles the ISS
Agreement.249 If a state wishes to undertake peaceful scientific activ-
ity aboard the International Space Station, under international space
law it is the duty of the space station's managing body to permit those
scientists aboard, but it is not their duty to conduct the research for
any other party.25° It does not matter whether the visiting state is a
member of the ISS Agreement so long as a Partner determines that the
activities are peaceful.' The United States must reconcile this duty
with its two main interests in space: to promote the commercial indus-
try and to protect national security interests.252
With the introduction of private companies in space, it will not be
long before less developed countries will be able to pay for access to
space without developing their own space program. Under the stand-
ing notion of "Common Heritage," the home states of private corpora-
tions should be as permissive as possible with permits for launch un-
der regulations like the FAA's.253 Minimizing the barriers that the
regulated space industry imposes will encourage foreign space pro-
grams to pursue commercial permits. 4 Since the United States is
seeking to expand the commercial sector anyway,255 the United States
should adopt a lenient policy that will encourage the development of
affordable space flights for less developed countries. The benefits of a
growing space industry will then contribute to the U.S. economy,
which is one objective of the CSLA.256
With new actors entering the space industry, it will be increas-
ingly difficult to monitor all activities in space and developments on
Earth.25 ' By establishing a concrete definition of "Common Heritage"
248. See CSLA, supra note 5 (the United States has taken up the responsibility of acting
as an example to others in outer space themselves).
249. Compare id., with ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 1(1).
250. ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 9(3); see also Petras, supra note 8, at 144-45.
251. ISS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 9(3)(a); see also Petras, supra note 8, at 145.
252. See Waldrop, supra note 21, at 163-64; SPACE POLICY, supra note 9, § 4.1.
253. See generall'y FAA Regulations, supra note 167.
254. See SPACE POLICY, supra note 9, § 4.13 (recognizing the growing practice to enter
into joint ventures with nations whose technology may later pose a threat).
255. Waldrop, supra note 21, at 163.
256. See CSLA, supra note 5, §§ (a)(2), (b)(1).
257. Espionage is already resulting in proliferation of space technology. See supra notes
46-49 and accompanying text.
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the United States can proceed with an agreement similar to the Moon
Treaty; one that oversees all activities in space and on Earth, without
concern that a moratorium will be placed over the commercial indus-
try. Other states will share in the interests they were originally trying
to protect in the Moon Treaty, so it will behoove more parties to create
a governing body quickly, and without putting unnecessary restric-
tions on a blossoming private sector.
To avoid further entanglements in the private sector, the commer-
cial industry will need to help poorer states. By helping poorer na-
tions develop a space industry, commercial explorers can be classified
for research and development. The private industry will profit from
space exploration and share tangible benefits with all mankind. Even
if it takes a significant amount of time to develop a governing body,
the commercial sector will be excluded so the industry will still have
room to grow.
To act as a governing body, the United States should look to in-
ternational organizations already in place. The COPUOS could apply
the framework of the ISS Agreement fairly easily. As a result, many
nations would be included in the efforts to keep space peaceful and
free of military impropriety. A cooperative body will free U.S. re-
sources that were once spent on monitoring other nations for military
capabilities. Efforts could then be diverted to research and develop-
ment projects at NASA, such as the mission to Mars or lunar coloniza-
tion. Instead of trying to keep other states from developing technol-
ogy, the United States could seek new advancements as a means of
maintaining a competitive edge. Both national security and the com-
mercial industry could benefit from this arrangement inside and out-
side of the United States. This model would also promote cooperation
and understanding between international partners.
V. CONCLUSION
On the television show Star Trek, Captain Kirk and the Enterprise
were envoys of Earth, not of any one state or nation."' The develop-
ment of a "Common Heritage" Principle was a bold step by interna-
tional bodies when it was first drafted. It was a symbolic gesture indi-
cating that all should equitably share the benefits of space.
Throughout the development of space law, this aspirational clause is
being shaped into definite terms. All people are entitled to equal
space access, all people are entitled to live under peaceful skies, and
258. Star Trek: The Man Trap (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 1966).
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all people are welcome to become equal partners in space exploration.
This leaves mankind with the same decision it has always faced: to
work together or race each other in the pursuit of a common goal. The
challenges of space are already as numerous as the stars; it would be
counterproductive to add more obstacles such as a competitive struc-
ture.
The United States currently finds itself in a unique position. As
citizens of a nation born in a new world, Americans know what possi-
bility lies on the new frontier. They also understand what cooperation
and competition can do to a growing industry. As the United States
drafts its pending legislation concerning space law, it should keep in
mind the ideals upon which space exploration was commenced. The
United States must find the courage to "boldly go where no man has
gone before." '59
Daniel A. Porras*
259. Id.; see also The Internet Movie Database, Memorable Quotes from "Star Trek"
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0060028/quotes (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
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